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Abstract 
The aim of the paper is to provide empirical evidence on the relationship between industrial 
structure and M&A process. We focus on the determining factors fostering a firm to choose 
controlling acquisitions or non-controlling  ones. We use the Acquisitions and Divestments 
Database (ADD), a data-base collecting equity operations made by top-90 EU leaders in the 
period 1987-1997. A logit analysis shows some variables that increase the probability that the 
firm’s entry mode choice is a non-controlling-acquisition: firm’s size, firm’s diversification 
strategy, industry concentration, oligopolistic competition. On the contrary, the R&D 
differentiated industries and the role of the stock exchange market enforce the probability that 
the firm’s entry mode is a controlling acquisition.  
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1. Introduction 
EU multinational enterprises (MNEs) are facing a wide process of reorganization 
concerning products, markets and manufacturing sites, mainly because of the new 
opportunities offered by Single Market Programm and the expectations about European 
Monetary Union. 
Within that reorganizing process, EU leading companies use different instruments to 
growth. The firm’s choice to enter a market seems very differentiated: when a firm 
decides to enter a market, it can choose a mode of entry, i.e. to select a codified mode 
for organizing its business, such as contractual agreement, licence, non-controlling 
acquisition, joint-venture, controlling acquisition, greenfield plant. 
In this paper, we focus on the different entry mode choice that a EU company can use 
within its external growth. The aims of the paper is to provide empirical evidence on the 
variables that at firm- industry- and country-level affect the choice between controlling 
acquisition and non-controlling acquisition as far as the company growth is concerned.  
The analysis is based on Acquisitions and Divestments Database (ADD), a data-base of 
the Italian National Resource Council, that collects equity operations implemented by 
top-90 EU leaders in the period 1987-1997. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. The next section deals with some theoretical 
aspects concerning the firm's entry mode. Some descriptive results of the empirical 
analysis carried out on the ADD database are presented in section 3. In section 4, the 
results of an econometric model are discussed. The aim of this exercise is to verify the 
existence of observable links between the choice of controlling vs non-controlling 
acquisition one hand, and some related variables at firm, industry and country level on 
the other hand. The concluding section summarizes the main results. The description of 
the ADD database is presented in annex. 
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2. The theoretical background 
Main question this paper it trying to answer is: "Which characteristics of the industrial 
system induce a firm to growth by take over rather than to growth by non-controlling 
acquisition?" Some answers are related to the theoretical references dealing with the 
role of M&As within the firm growth process. In particular, there are several studies 
which identify some firm, industry and country characteristics affecting the choice of 
entry strategy. 
2.1 The internalisation paradigm 
The first group of theories is concerned with the market imperfections. The company’s 
choice is among hierarchical growth (including external growth by acquisitions or 
internal growth by investments), market transactions and partnerships (including non-
equity agreements, and equity agreements such as joint ventures and non-controlling 
acquisitions). The main references are the transaction cost theory by Coase (1937) and 
Williamson (1991). 
According to Coase, the firm takes the place of the market when the internal costs of 
coordination are lower than the costs of the market itself. In the original framework 
there are only two possible organizational solutions: on the one hand, the hierarchical 
form (i.e. accumulation of internal resources or acquisition1 of an existing firm), and on 
the other, the market (i.e. simple "spot" transactions). Agreements and joint ventures are 
defined as an intermediate form between market and hierarchy, and are not optimal with 
respect to hierarchy (first best). 
Within the transaction cost theory (Williamson, 1991) firms choose the best way of 
growth according to three attributes of transactions: the frequency of the deal, its degree 
of uncertainty, the amount of the idiosyncratic investments necessary to implement the 
transaction. The latter is the main factor: when assets specificity is high, firm is likely to 
control the operation using controlling acquisition or internal investments. In other 
                                                 
1  M&A represents a tool to achieve hierarchical forms in a quickly way, in comparison with the 
traditional internal growth. 
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cases,  even non-controlling acquisitions can be a first best solution, as hierarchical 
growth or market transactions.  
2.2 The complementary asset theory  
According to the complementary asset theory (Teece, 1986), within the global 
competition the firms need a lot of financial, managerial, technological, manufacturing 
and commercial resources in order to manufacture a wide range of products, to 
commerce them on a wide range of countries, to develop a wide range of innovations. 
As high transaction costs do not allow firms to have the direct control of such a huge 
amount of resources, they try to have indirect control of them through agreements and 
joint ventures, especially at an international level2. Furthermore, the hierarchical 
organization can be quickly improved by M&As, which means that the missing assets 
can be directly acquired instead of pursuing the internal growth at a slower pace. The 
company size plays a specific role within this pattern of growth: because of their 
financial contraints, SMEs prefer to acquire the missing complementary assets using 
non-controlling acquisitions, rather than to finance a controlling operation. In addition, 
non-controlling operations can reduce the cost of organization and bureaucracy of very 
large companies (Williamson,  1991), especially within oligopolistic markets (Mutinelli 
and Piscitello, 1998). 
According to the complexity of the business, i.e. the difficulty to have and manage 
within the company all the complementary assets, company will choose controlling or 
non-controlling operations: the latter when business is complex, with regards to the 
original company resources3. 
 
                                                 
2  Teece emphasises that very often the firm introducing innovation doesn’t take advantage of it, in 
comparison with its competitors; very often, the innovation advantages are gained by the firm which 
owns all the resources required to exploit them (Teece, 1986). 
3  Complementary assets are “complex” when they derive from the “ownership advantages” of other 
firms, such as R&D, learning-by-doing process, advertisement, rent positions. 
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2.3 The entry mode choice at international level 
Theories dealing with Foreign Direct Investments (FDIs) can be useful to focus on the 
choice between acquisitions and joint ventures at international level4.  
The main reference is the eclectic approach by Dunning (1993), where FDIs and cross-
border M&As have strong links with: 
- Ownership advantages, related to full control of specific resources - such as 
technology, economies of scale, labour skills, brand name - ensuring the firm a 
competitive advantage at an international level. 
- Locational advantages, related to some characteristics of the destination country, 
such as cost of production factors, trade barriers (even natural, such as transport 
costs), innovation systems, market size, market growth, fiscal regime, and so on.  
- Internalization advantages, related to market imperfections, such as uncertainty and 
cost of market transactions (Buckley and Casson, 1985). 
Within the OLI approach, the choice between controlling and non-controlling 
acquisitions depends on the comparison between internalisation advantages and 
ownership advantages: when internalisation advantages are less important than 
ownership ones, company should prefer non-controlling growth. Within the first step of 
the decision process, localization advantages are important to define where to invest 
(i.e. national vs international investment): when localization advantages are high, the 
FDI becomes profitable, and the decision of the entry mode will be made according to 
the characteristics of the destination country too. 
The latter are important as far as the asymmetric information that firm must manage 
abroad are concerned.  
High differences between the national cultural characteristics of the home and that one 
of the host countries make it difficult for MNEs to manage themselves the foreign 
business: in this case non-controlling operations reduce the asymmetric information 
                                                 
4  It is worthily to say that FDIs are mainly composed of acquisitions, whereas greenfield investments 
amount to slightly 10% of total FDIs (Dunning, 1997; Unctad, 1995). The choice between greenfiled 
investments and acquisitions is reviewed in Gorg (1998). 
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concerning economic, financial, institutional and cultural aspects. In addition, there are 
some aspects of the home country that affect the subsidiary ownership policies of MNEs 
(Hennart, 1998). This national character theory is based on four dimensions of national 
culture (Hofstede, 1980) that seem to affect the entry mode choice of their MNEs, in the 
sense that cultural distance encourages deployment of shared-control modes (Kogut and 
Singh, 1988). 
2.4 The evolutionary approach 
According to the evolutionary approach, the experience in the past growth strategy 
affects the present moves. The experience is important in order to overcome the 
organizational difficulties coming from the external growth. 
There is a hierarchical scale among the different entry mode choice, where controlling 
acquisition is more difficult to carry out than non-controlling one, and the latter is more 
difficult than non-equity agreement. In order to minimize the uncertainty of the growth, 
the firm’s entry mode preference can slowly move from non-controlling to controlling 
acquisition, accordingly the accumulation of managerial resources due to the learning 
process (Baden Fuller, 1993). This linear view represents the evolution of the 
organizational skills of the company, where the learning process allow firms to search 
and acquire the missing resources and assets. The more the previous company’s number 
of controlling acquisitions, the more the learning process reduce uncertainty of  the 
controlling growth strategy. Viceversa, the past non-controlling growth experience 
reduce the uncertainty of the present non-controlling strategy. 
Experience plays a main role at international level and at industrial level, too. 
Within the first point, the learning process of going abroad  can reduce growth 
uncertainty according to the previous number of acquisitions made in that country. 
Kogut and Singh (1988) predicts that the cumulative evolutionary learning process in 
“going abroad” increases the probability of choosing a wholly-owned subsidiary, 
instead of a non-controlling one. 
Ceris-CNR, W.P. N° 10/1999 
 
 7
Within the second point, the learning process of business diversification can reduce 
growth uncertainty according to the previous number of acquisitions made in non-core 
sectors. 
On the basis of the Dunning’s theory, all the learning experiences  represents an 
ownership advantage, specifically related to the firm, that encourages the external 
growth  at national or international level. 
2.5 The industrial organization approach 
The structure of the industry affects the company’s choice about the entry mode. 
Within the high concentrated industries, non-controlling acquisitions can be useful to 
exploit economies of scale without affecting the oligopolistic equilibria of such a sector 
(Linda, 1988). In addition, local antitrust authorities seem more tolerant of non-
controlling operations than controlling ones, especially if  the partner is coming from 
abroad or from a different sector (Kay et al., 1987).  
Within the high-tech industries, non-controlling acquisitions allow company to produce 
and commerce the innovative product during the “imitation lag” before it is copied, or it 
becomes obsolete (Teece, 1986). This view is quite different from the traditional one, 
that focus on  the market failure in the technology market: because of information 
asymmetry concerning  technological transfer, firms prefer to have a complete control 
of the acquired firm, and not to share it with a potential free-rider partner (Arrow, 1972; 
Caves, 1982). During the Eighties, due to the high importance of the technological 
competitive factors, the non-controlling acquisition played a new strategic role, in order 
to create inter-firm networks basically focused on managing new technology. 
Within industries  where trade barriers are low, it is possible to find a lesser degree of 
market imperfection, and so a lesser degree of transaction costs: this could reduce the 
internalisation advantages and fostering the non-controlling growth strategy. 
 
Some company variables are important too. For example, company’s size limits the 
amount of financial, managerial and economic resources that a firm can invest. Because 
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of this, the higher the size of the company, the higher the potential amount of 
controlling acquisitions (see section 2.2). However, the partner size is important too. 
According to Kogut and Singh (1988), the post-merger management costs are related to 
the size of the business acquired: in order to avoid them, firms can choose to share the 
relationships, instead of to pursue a wholly-owned operation. In addition, as large 
investments are more risky than small ones, company could share that risk with a 
partner (Kogut and Singh, 1989). 
Sharing risk is a typical goal of the diversification strategy, that can be easily supported 
by non-controlling operations. In addition, even the company’s degree of diversification 
is important: very diversified companies at product or geographical level can maybe 
suffer of managerial and financial constraints related to the  growth outside the core 
markets. The neo-institutionalist approach (Williamson, 1985) argues that this kind of 
company has a bureaucratic and complex hierarchy that produce high costs of 
organization (and of growth internalization), that can be avoid using non-controlling 
growth. 
3.The empirical analysis: descriptive framework 
3.1 General findings 
According to ADD data-base, top-90 leading EU companies made 2921 M&A 
operations over the period 1987-19975. 
Table 1 shows M&A operations classified by type: the amount of controlling 
acquisitions (70%) is dramatically higher than the amount of non-controlling ones 
(30%). Controlling acquisitions are composed of majority acquisitions, i.e. more than 
50% of total firm’s shares, and asset deals, i.e. the deals concerning business units or 
plants. 
                                                 
5  The ADD data-base considers the acquisitions and the divestments that top-102 EU industrial leaders 
made in manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors. In this paper we do not consider the 
companies having a leading position within the EU market that are from US (11 companies) and 
Canada (1). In addition, we do not consider the divestment operations made by EU leaders. Because 
of this limitation, we used 2826 out of 4276 observations provided by ADD data-base. 
Ceris-CNR, W.P. N° 10/1999 
 
 9
Within the latter, minority interests (17%) prevail on the parity interests (9%), i.e. 50-50 
shares, and on the strengthening operations (4%), i.e. increase of a previous minority 
interest6. 
 
Table 1:  1987-1997 M&As by transacted share 
 % 
Controlling  operations 57 
Minority operations 17 
Parity operations 9 
Strengthening* operations 4 
Assets 13 
Total 100 
Number 2826 
Source: Ceris-Cnr 
* strengthening operations increase a previous minority,  not exceeding 50%. 
 
Table 2 shows at what extent EU leaders use M&As to pursue multinational growth. 
Only 26% of total operations are domestic ones. The cross-border M&As are mainly 
made within the European boundaries (44%), whereas 22% of the total M&As 
represents the relationship with other industrialized countries (US and Canada). EU 
leaders are not  strongly involved within non-industrialized countries, such as East 
Europe, South East, Latin America ones. Maybe the pattern of company’s growth 
within LDCs uses non-equity tools, such as contractual agreements7  or greenfield 
investments. 
In our analysis, the amount of cross-border M&As (74% of total) is higher with respect 
to EC Commission data about 1000 largest EU firms (35-40%) (EC Commission, 
several years; EC Commission 1998). As our sample is composed of the top-90 leading 
EU firms, the difference could be justified by the firm size variable, that affects 
positively the multinational growth.  
                                                 
6  The final interest level shall not exceed 50%. 
7  For example, the clothing companies usually delocate production capacity towards LDC using the 
Outward Processing Trade (Opt) tool. 
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Other empirical analyses confirm the role of European firms (Gerosky and 
Vlassopoulos, 1990; Sachwald, 1994) and that one of OECD countries within M&A 
process (Unctad, 1995; Bleeke et al., 1990; EC, 1998). 
As far as the entry mode choice is concerned, non-controlling acquisitions emerge as a 
characteristic of the domestic and of the LDC  acquisitions, whereas controlling 
operations are mainly made within the other OECD countries.  
 
Table 2 – M&A operations by geographical area (country of destination) 
 Controlling 
acquisitions 
Non-controlling 
acquisitions 
Total 
 % % % 
Domestic 25 31 26 
Europe 43 45 44 
Other OECD 25 12 22 
LDC 8 12 9 
Total 100 100 100 
Number 2047 779 2826 
Source: Ceris-Cnr 
 
As far as EU (12) companies are concerned, it is possible to compare the weight of the 
company production at a national (or international) level, on the one hand, and the 
weight of company M&As at a national (or international) level, on the other hand: on 
average, 80% of the company production derives from national plants, whereas only 
29% of their M&As are made in the domestic market. This is a rough indicator of one 
of the M&A aims: the geographical diversification of  production capacity and  
distribution channels. 
3.2 Findings at a  company level 
As far as the M&As made by each EU leader are concerned, some companies seem 
extremely interested in the external growth: Unilever, IRI, Ferruzzi, Philips, Grand 
Metropolitan, ABB have performed more than one hundred of operations over the 1987-
1997 period. On the contrary, ZF, Dassault, Jachob Suchard, Michelin and Klockner 
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Humboldt made less than ten operations each. In addition, we find some EU leaders that 
were acquired by another companies - such as Mbb and Salzgitter - counting for one 
divestment operation only. 
As far as the internationalization process is concerned, the study shows a very different 
company’s behaviour. On the one hand, some companies acted mainly in the domestic 
market: the percentage of domestic M&As out of total M&As is more than 70% for  
British Aerospace, Krupp, Unigate, IRI; on the other hand, several companies show a 
high interest in the cross-border M&As: the percentage of cross-border M&As out of 
total M&As is more than 80% for ZF, Shell, Solvay, Gec Alstholm, Hoescht, Michelin, 
Unilever.  
Some companies engaged an external growth mainly based on non-controlling 
acquisitions: in the case of BRT, 98% of the acquisitions made in the period 1987-1997 
are controlling ones; other companies where controlling acquisition are important are 
Unilever (93%), Grand Metropolitan (85%), Hoeschst (70%). On the contrary, some 
companies prefer the non-controlling growth: IRI (53%), Usinor (53%), Fiat (51%), 
Daimler (48%).  
3.3 Findings at a country level 
As far as country distribution of M&As is concerned, table 3 shows the different interest 
of EU companies for each EU (12) country. We can consider operations according to 
the country of destination (target firm) or  the country of origin (acquirer firm).  
As far as M&As by country of destination are concerned, Great Britain is the leading 
country, as it represents 27% of the total EU operations, and it is followed by Germany 
(20%), France (18%) and Italy (17%). It is difficult to compare our findings with other 
empirical analyses. For example, in the EC Commission (1998) data about 1991-1993 
the country position is slightly different: Great Britain (29%), France (18%), Germany 
(14%), Italy (6%)8. 
                                                 
8  Data are difficult to compare as the EC Commission statistics are counted in M&A value and  our 
statistics are counted in number of  M&As.  
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Table 3 – M&A operations within EU (12) countries (country of destination) 
 Number of  M&A 
operations 
according to the 
country of 
destination (%) 
Number of  M&A 
operations  
according to the 
country of origin 
(%) 
Mln Ecu 90 
leader 
production 
(%) 
Number of 
leaders 
according to the 
country of origin 
(%) 
Benelux, Denmark, Ireland 7 14 8 12 
Spain, Portugal, Greece 10 1 4 1 
Great Britain 27 27 15 29 
France 18 21 21 18 
Germany 20 25 39 32 
Italy 17 12 13 8 
Total 100 100 100 100 
Source: Ceris-Cnr 
 
As far as M&As by country of origin are concerned, we find similar results. English 
leaders made a lot of M&As: 27% of the total M&As, the same percentage that Great 
Britain showed within the distribution according to country of destination, whereas 
Germany and France have a lower percentage (25% and 21% respectively). 
The comparison between the second and the fourth column suggests a lower amount of 
M&A per-capita for the English and the German companies, whereas the M&As made 
by Italian and France leaders are more numerous than the sample average9. 
In addition, we can compare M&A distribution with the importance of each country as 
far as total 90-company production is concerned. 
If we compare the firth and the third column, in Great Britain there is a positive 
difference between its M&A weight (27%) and  its production weight (15%), viceversa 
in Germany, where the M&A weight (20%) is lower than the importance of the country 
as a production site (39%). The first case could be justified by the efficiency of English 
financial market (Franks and Mayer, 1990), that attracts a lot of investors10; the second 
one by the institutional characteristics of the German capitalism, where the strong links 
                                                 
9  The Italian case could be partly due to the better information that ADD has about Italian industrial 
system. 
10  High transparency of UK financial market maybe biased the ADD data collection, with an 
overestimation of UK data. 
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among companies, banks and public institutions make German companies not so easy to 
take over 11. Italy shows a M&A weight (17%) higher than the production weight 
(13%), maybe due to the deep restructuring process of its companies, even at cross-
border level.  
The distribution of acquisitions according to the entry mode choice reveals a different 
pattern of growth concerning acquisitions made in Great Britain (table 4):  within that 
country  English and European leaders prefer to use controlling operations (the 78% of 
the total number), instead of non controlling ones (22%). Also in Germany that 
percentage is significantly high (69%). 
On the contrary, within some Southern countries, such as Italy, France or Spain-
Portugal-Greece, prevail the non-controlling growth. 
 
Table 4 - – M&A operations within EU (12) countries (country of destination): 
the controlling vs. non-controlling choice (%) 
controlling 
acquisitions 
non-controlling 
acquisitions 
Total 
Benelux, Denmark, Ireland 65.0 35.0 100 
Spain, Portugal, Greece 57.0 43.0 100 
Great Britain 78.5 21.5 100 
France 57.4 42.6 100 
Germany 69.4 30.6 100 
Italy 60.4 39.6 100 
Total % 66.5 33.5 100 
Total (number) 1301 655      1956 
Source: Ceris-Cnr 
 
                                                 
11  In Italy we remember how Pirelli failed in the 1990 taking over of Continental. 
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3.4 Findings at an industry level 
As far as the industry distribution of M&As is concerned, some links could be noticed 
between the company behaviour and the industry-specific factors (Davies and Lyons, 
1988). 
Among the industry-specific factors the role of sunk costs is relevant: R&D and 
advertisement investments represent an important determinant of product and 
geographical diversification (Davies et al., 1995). For this reason we expect these 
variables could affect the M&A process too. 
The distribution of M&As according to the type of product differentiation of the 
primary sector of the 90 EU companies12 do not show any relations with the type of 
transacted shares: the distribution of controlling and non-controlling acquisition is more 
or less the same (table 5).  
 
Table 5 – Type of M&As by industry (industry of origin)  
(%) 
 Controlling 
acquisitions 
Non- 
controlling 
acquisitions 
Total 
Homogeneous products 72 28 100 
Differentiated products by 
R&D 
73 27 100 
Differentiated products by 
advertisement 
78 22 100 
Differentiated products by 
R&D and advertisement  
73 26 100 
Total 74 26 100 
Source: Ceris-Cnr 
 
Only if we disaggregate the non-controlling operation in minority acquisitions and 
parity acquisitions we can find the relevance of parity acquisitions within the industries 
based on R&D-and-advertisement product differentiation. This is consistent with the 
                                                 
12  The list of industries according to their product differentiation tool is presented in appendix of the 
Davies and Lyons volume (1996). 
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importance of sharing technology in obtaining the company’s competitive advantage 
(Neven and Siotis, 1996) and with the role of licensing for worldwide brand-names. 
 
As far as the geographic area involved within the M&A process, industries based on 
R&D-and-advertisement product differentiation have the higher share of cross-border 
M&As. This could be explained by the role of intangible investments on 
multinationalization (Markusen (1995). The advantages that  multinational firms can 
exploit in producing in foreign countries are mainly based on intangible assets, resulting 
by their R&D and advertising expenditures (Sutton, 1991; De Woot, 1990; Teece, 
1986). 
4. The econometric exercise 
This section is going to complement the descriptive analysis developed so far with some 
preliminary econometric results. The econometric exercise concerns a basic model on 
the choice between controlling and non-controlling acquisitions carried out by 90 EU 
leaders over the period 1987-199713.  
Because of the nature of the dependent variable, a binomial logistic model was 
estimated, where the dependent variable is the likelihood of a firm making a specific 
type of acquisition. The unit of observation is the acquisition. The regression 
coefficients estimate the impact of the independent variables on the probability that the 
entry mode will be a controlling operation. A positive sign for the coefficient means that 
the variable increases the probability of a controlling acquisition. 
Most of the theoretical references examined in section 2 will help in defining the 
framework for the empirical analysis. 
                                                 
13  The econometric exercise deals with 2201 out of 2826 cases, as it does not consider the operations 
where the industry classification  according to the product differentiation tool is not available.  
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4.1 Hypotheses and variables 
This econometric exercise has the purpose to answer the following question: "Which are 
the firm-specific, industry-specific and country-specific variables affecting the choice 
between controlling and non-controlling acquisitions performed by the leading EU 
companies?"  
 
Let L[CNT(ACQ)] be the probability that the acquisition carried out by EU leading 
companies over the period 1987-1997 is a controlling acquisition (rather then a non-
controlling one). The specification of the basic model is as follows: 
 
L[CNT(ACQ)] = F [X(F), Y(I), Z(C)] 
 
Where: 
Dependent variable is CNT(ACQ), a dummy variable which is equal to 1 for all the 
cases where a given firm makes a controlling acquisition. If firm  makes a non-
controlling acquisition, CNT=0.  
 
X(F) = vector of firm characteristics, including SIZE, DIV  and OLIGOP variables 
Y(I) = vector of industry characteristics, including TECH, INTOPEN and CONC variables 
Z(C) = vector of country characteristics, including MANAGER and AREA variables. 
 
Independent variables for our samples are the following: 
SIZE= the log of the acquiring firm turnover (1987 in millions of ECU). On the one 
hand, we expect that large companies deal mainly with controlling acquisitions: the 
more financial, organisation and technological resources are available to the company, 
the greater the opportunity of getting the control of other companies. On the other hand, 
large companies cannot afford to increase their internalisation costs of organization, and 
therefore they use non-controlling acquisition to a  greater extent (Colombo, 1995). 
SIZE source is table A2.2 of the book by Davies e Lyons (1996). To prevent distortion 
due to the dimension, the variable was converted into  the logarithmic formula. 
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DIV= dummy for the diversification strategy. DIV=1 if the target firm business 
represents a diversification strategy of the acquirer (at 3-digt level)14. In case of 
diversification, company can prefer the non-controlling entry mode, in order to reduce 
the  post-merger management  costs (Kogut and Singh, 1988), or to reduce the 
difficulties in assessing the value of the target firm (Balakrishnan and Koza (1993). On 
the contrary, we could say that within very new sector, company doesn’t have any asset 
to share with the partner, and so it will look for an entire firm to acquire. 
OLIGOP= dummy for the relationships within the EU oligopolistic arena. OLIGOP=1 if 
target and acquirer firms belong to the oligopolistic arena of the top-90 EU leading 
companies. We expect that between leading companies should prevail the non-
controlling acquisition, accordingly to the higher difficulty to disentangle the desired 
assets from the company (Kay et al., 1987) and to modify the market power 
relationships within oligopolistic markets (Jacquemin et al., 1989). 
TECH= dummy for the main competitive factor of the company’s growth. If the 
acquirer’s industry is a R&D-differentiated industries, TECH=1. TECH is equal to 0 
when the acquirer is mainly located in a non-differentiated industries or in a 
differentiated industry by advertisement. The source for this variable is the Davies and 
Lyons database (1996). According to the complementary asset theory (Teece, 1992), we 
expect that in the R&D-differentiated industries will prevail non-controlling acquisition. 
On the contrary, following the traditional view of market-failures within the 
technological markets (Arrow, 1972), we should expect a positive sign of the 
coefficient15.  
INTOPEN= ratio of EU export plus import from extra-EU countries to EU production 
of the firm’s origin industry. This is a proxy of the international open of the industry. 
The industry more exposed to the international competition is also likely an industry 
with a low degree of trade barriers: according to the OLI approach this means a low 
degree of internalisation advantages too. Where internalisation advantages are low, non-
                                                 
14 In comparison with other studies about the relationship between acquisitions and diversification 
strategy (Goudie and Meeks, 1982), in our study we compare all the sectors at 3-digit level where 
acquirer and the acquired firms produce, and not only their primary industry.  
15 Controlling acquisitions reduce the transaction costs of the technological transfer. 
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controlling acquisitions are more likely than controlling ones. The source for this 
variable is the Davies and Lyons database (1996). 
CONC= Herfindal concentration ratio of the industry entered at EU level (3-digit). 
According to Kay et al. (1987) we expect that in high concentrated industries company 
should prefer non-controlling acquisitions in order to reduce the opposition of the 
antitrust authority. The source for this variable is the Davies and Lyons database (1996). 
MANAGER= the ratio of stock exchange market value to GDP at 1987 of the home 
country. We expect that companies acting in a country characterised by a high 
importance of stock exchange market will have more opportunities to finance their 
growth using controlling acquisitions. The source for this variable is again the Davies 
and Lyons database (1996). 
AREA= dummy for the destination country. AREA should reflect the cultural distance 
between EU countries and the non-EU ones. Because of this, AREA=1 if the target firm 
is located within Europe, AREA=0 if target firm is located outside UE countries. We 
expect that the difference within European companies and non-European ones will 
affect the kind of acquisitions: the higher the cultural distance between them and the 
partner, the higher will be the preference for non-controlling acquisition (Kay et al., 
1996). By non-controlling acquisitions mode and by the support of a local partner, 
companies can minimise the negative asymmetric information concerning local markets. 
4.2 The results 
The matrix  of correlations of the independent variables (table 6) suggests little 
collinearity. Almost all correlations are low, the two highest correlation coefficients 
being the ones between  SIZE and MANAGER (-0.45)  and between  SIZE and TECH 
(0.39). 
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Table 6 - Correlation matrix 
 TECH MANAGER AREA SIZE INTOPEN DIV OLIGOP CONC
Minimum 0 2.694 0 6.833 0.025 0 0 0.001
Maximum 1 4.627 1 10.183 2.583 1 1 0.203
Mean 0.659 3.687 0.673 8.713 0.605 0.198 0.168 0.038
Standard 
dev. 
0.473 0.643 0.4691 0.8094 0.4147 0.399 0.374 0.034
Cases 2201 2201 2201 2201 2201 2201 2201 2201
    
TECH  1    
MANAGER -0.1672 1   
AREA -0.079 -0.1053 1   
SIZE 0.3933 -0.4468 -0.0467 1   
INTOPEN -0.0106 -0.2969 0.0656 0.1364 1   
DIV -0.0583 0.0392 -0.0054 -0.0875 -0.0098 1  
OLIGOP 0.1057 -0.083 0.2127 0.0847 0.0525 0.001 1 
CONC 0.2954 -0.1171 -0.0047 0.2374 0.0587 0.0666 0.0357 1
 
The results of the binomial logistic regression model are presented in table 7. A positive 
coefficient for an independent variable means that it tends to increase the probability 
that a EU leading company entered through a controlling  acquisition. 
The model has a good overall explanatory power, with chi-squared of 113 (p=0.00000) 
and it correctly classifies 76% of the observations. 
The variables that increase the probability that the entry mode is a controlling 
acquisition are the R&D product differentiation strategy, that confirms the importance 
of transaction costs within the technological markets, and the role of the stock exchange 
market, that shows how the financial resources are important. 
The variables that increase the probability that the entry mode is a non-controlling 
acquisition are: 
- company size, in the sense that large firms can negotiate good conditions in joint-
ventures, thanks to their managerial resources and oligopolistic power (Mutinelli 
and Piscitello, 1998). 
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- the transaction between two oligopolistic competitors, confirming the hypothesis of   
Kay et al.(1996). 
- the concentration ratio of the acquirer's industry, following the prediction on the 
market power relationships (Jacquemin, 1989). 
- the diversification strategy, according to the transaction costs approach. 
As far as the international open of the acquirer's industry and the cultural distance 
between home and host countries, the coefficients have the expected sign, but a low 
significance. 
 
Table 7 -Logit regression model 
MAXIMUN LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATES 
Dependent variable: CONTROLLING MODE 
Probability of controlling / non-controlling M&A 
 
Variable Coefficient t-statistics Significance 
Constant 2.6293 3.072 0.0021 
SIZE -0.2791 -3.696 0.0002 
TECH 0.3852 3.186 0.0014 
MANAGER 0.3568 3.832 0.0001 
INTOPEN -0.1307 -0.986 0.3242 
AREA -0.2487 -2.137 0.0325 
DIV -0.3107 -2.518 0.0118 
OLIGOP -0.4547 -3.499 0.0005 
CONC -5.5013 -3.735 0.0002 
Number of Observations 2201 
Log Likelihood -1177.82 
Restricted Log Likelihood -1234.11 
Chi Squared 112.581 
degree of Freedom 8 
Percentage of predicted outcomes = 76% 
5. Final Remarks 
By means of  the ADD data-base we can study the M&A process within the EU 
industrial system as a whole. 
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The descriptive analysis and the econometric exercise provide a preliminary answer to 
the following question: which are the main variables at firm, industry and country level 
that affect the pattern of company growth based on M&As? Our attention was mainly 
focused on the entry mode choice that EU leaders use in their external growth. 
First of all, the study shows a very different usage of the M&As as far as the entry mode 
choice is concerned. Even if the entire sample of top-90 EU leaders prefer wholly-
owned operations, that represents the 70% of total number of operations, we can find 
several companies show a high interest in the non-controlling acquisitions. 
The two groups apparently refer to the same industries or the same countries, but thanks 
to the econometric exercise we were able to better define some differences within the 
two type of external growth strategy.  The probability that an acquisition made by EU 
companies is a controlling or a non-controlling M&A is related to some firm, industry 
and country-specific variables. 
Some variables increase the probability that the entry mode choice is a non-controlling-
acquisition: firm’s size, firm’s diversification, industrial concentration, oligopolistic 
competition. On the contrary, the R&D product differentiation strategy (at industry 
level) and the role of the stock exchange market (at country level) enforce the 
probability that the entry mode is a wholly-owned acquisition.  
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Annex: The Ceris ADD database 
The ADD database (Acquisition and Divestment Database) was built up at Ceris-Cnr in 
order to investigate the  external growth of large EU firms. The ADD database includes 
the first 102 companies by  turnover of the EU “Market Share Matrix” (MSM) a 
database generated on the EU leading companies, i.e. the first 5 producers in Europe in 
at least one of one hundred 3-digit industries. The MSM database derives from a project 
coordinated by Steve Davies and Bruce Lyons (1996) on the structure of European 
manufacturing industry. The consistency between  the two databases makes it possible 
for us to use information on both diversification and internationalisation of EU firms 
(MSM) and on their external growth (ADD). 
The ADD database collects data from financial newspapers and magazines, company  
reports, directories of the major  stock markets world-wide, M&A data supplied by IDD 
(a Us data-provider) and KPMG Peat Marwick. 
The ADD database is structured as follows: 
- a set of variables describing  the “target” of the deal, i.e. the company, or the portion 
of it, that has been acquired or established in the case of a new joint venture: name of 
the company, controlling group, country, turnover, employment, primary and secondary 
industries (according to the 1981 Nace-Clio 3-digit classification). 
- a set of variables referring to the acquiring firm: name of the company, controlling 
group, country, turnover, employment, primary and secondary industries. 
- a set of variables referring to the characteristics of the deal itself: date of the operation, 
value, the type of deal (majority, minority, joint-venture, assets).  
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